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Jacques Rancière’s commitment to intellectual equality is a storied, 
political awakening in postwar French philosophy. Its main staging points are 
well known: this brilliant pupil of Althusser undergoes a conversion experience 
around the time of the 1968 student revolts in France. He rejects the 
Althusserian doxa of a theoretical vanguard leading the revolutionary masses, 
and its premise of a division between labor and intellect. The repudiation of 
Althusserianism, and his noted contributions to it, marks Rancière’s conversion 
to the practice of intellectual equality.1 In his subsequent writings, he tirelessly 
puts forward the view that the oppressed understand their own oppression. 
His archival work on the nineteenth century implements this commitment, 
exploring, among others, the writing of carpenters and seamstresses. Their 
words, glossed over by the historians and poets of the revolution, are not 
unthinking expressions of an alienated state but reflective articulations of their 
dreams for emancipation.2  
Rancière’s thesis is that intellectual equality exists and that it is practiced; 
and one needs to be vigilant about the habits that suppress it, and 
acknowledge the places, moments, and modes of its expression. Intellectual 
equality is not an “idea,” it is an experience. And, Rancière thinks the fact of its 
existence can be amplified in its retelling. One of the general explanatory 
frames used in Rancière’s presentation of the topic of intellectual equality is 
the opposition between leisure and work. This opposition generally endorses 
the division between intellect and labor. Hence the division between 
intellectual activity and work is sustained in many theories which seek an 
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extended franchise for leisure, even if this extension is understood as a 
remodeling of labor to include fulfilling activities. Rancière’s thesis of 
intellectual equality is unusual in this respect because he does not take the 
side of leisure against work. Instead he documents the experience of the state 
of reverie as an antidote to the division of labor. In this article, I would like to 
explore the significance of the role he ascribes to reverie, and consider the 
implications of his stated view of its independence from the leisure/work 
opposition. If the latter scales different types of action in relation to the value 
of freedom, and reverie is defined in its disengagement from action, it is 
important to ask why and how reverie is connected to Rancière’s vision of 
emancipation. Is it possible to connect the positive treatment of the state of 
reverie with other views Rancière holds about emancipation? The question is 
particularly important in light of the weight given to willed action as the path 
to intellectual emancipation in texts like The Ignorant Schoolmaster.  
The Distinction Between Leisure and Work 
Recent critical theory has revived the utility of classical Marxist concepts 
such as “alienation” for analyzing pathologies in the contemporary labor 
market. There has been related attention to the contemporary applicability of 
those passages in Marx’s early 1844 manuscripts, dealing with obstacles to the 
full development of the human faculties, and advocating their removal.3 The 
different ways the distinction between leisure and work is used to arrange this 
material on alienation and anthropological fulfilment is worth comment. 
Occasionally, it is argued that working life should provide opportunities for 
satisfaction and meaningful labor, thus addressing the call in Marx’s early 
writing for attention to full anthropological development as the panacea for 
alienation.4 In this context, the distinction between leisure and work is 
reorganized, so that some of the satisfactions associated with the former are 
included in the category, and are expected as features, of work. An image of 
the emancipated life as a purposeful life is propagated; and, the core of this 
image is the pursuit of satisfying, productive work. We can mention here the 
rejection of industrial, factory work by nineteenth century figures like William 
Morris. Morris advocated the restoration of design as a component of the 
process of production. He saw the separation between design and production 
as the engine of social exploitation and misery, and insisted that work done 
without pleasure was not worth doing.5 His position, of course, was not limited 
to a theory of work, but extended into a general condemnation of the ugliness 
and waste of industrial production.  
More recently, the creeping indistinction between leisure and work has 
been identified as the problem. Here, it is less the anthropological 
“development” opportunities associated with leisure that are highlighted. 
Instead, attention is drawn to the way that contemporary work spaces, 
especially in the “knowledge economy,” are reorganized to include supported 
opportunities for play, food, companionship, and sleep; or, conversely, to the 
way that work is incorporated in the home through online devices and 
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platforms to enable more flexible working hours. Work spaces may become 
sites that accommodate leisure activity, or homes may become adaptable to 
facilitate work, but in either case the effect is to extend working hours and 
reduce leisure time. In this conception, the image of emancipated life is tied 
to leisure time, which is time considered to be entirely separate from any 
calculated advancement of corporate productivity.6  
Rancière steps outside the combination of positions that take on the 
work/leisure distinction: rather than identifying leisure as the basis for an 
anthropological account of human fulfilment, he is sharply critical of the 
category of leisure, which he considers to be premised on the division of labor; 
and he identifies reverie as the antidote not just to leisure, but also to the 
alienation of work. The classical origins of the work/leisure distinction in 
Aristotle’s Politics and the semantic field of free and noble action involved in 
it, can partly explain Rancière’s criticisms of the work/leisure distinction, even 
if they do not explain the reasoning behind his view that reverie is some kind 
of counter-concept.  
Aristotle distinguishes leisure from play or relaxation by virtue of the 
noble status leisure has as the “first principle of all action.”7 He further relates 
leisure to both happiness and excellence and distinguishes it as the type of 
activity that is self-fulfilling, from those activities that produce usable objects 
and thus find their justification and measure in their respective uses. If human 
activity can be divided into requirements for both leisure and occupation, 
“leisure is better than occupation and is its end,”8 for “he who is occupied has 
in view some end which he has not attained.”9 In his reflections on the 
branches of education, he comments that the free and exalted soul is not 
“always seeking after the useful”10; and the “sort of education in which parents 
should train their sons” is not for the proximate pursuit of use or necessity, but 
because an end “is liberal or noble.”11 Happiness, not play, is such an end. Play 
is disqualified as a liberal or noble end. As play is unskilled, it is unsuited to 
either produce excellence or culminate in happiness and cannot therefore be 
the end for the sake of which useful occupations are undertaken.  
In Aristotle’s Politics, the connections between leisure and happiness are 
raised in the context of discussing constitutional arrangements for allocating 
different kinds of occupations and responsibilities to different kinds of people. 
Happiness, he writes in the Politics, “cannot exist without excellence”12 and it 
follows that not every man shall “be at once farmer, artisan, councillor, 
judge.”13 The topic of leisure thus underpins fundamental questions such as 
the best form of government, and the different branches and purposes of 
education, insofar as these all relate to how different activities in a state are 
apportioned. A division of labor is necessary to support the noble ends of 
leisure, which include political duty.  
The best form of government is the one that is “best governed” and that 
“possesses men who are just absolutely and not merely relatively to the 
A l i s o n  R o s s  |  7 9  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXVII, No 2 (2019)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2019.890 
principle of the constitution.”14 The citizens in the best governed state “must 
not lead the life of artisans or tradesmen, for such a life is ignoble and inimical 
to excellence. Neither must they be farmers, since leisure is necessary both for 
the development of excellence and the performance of political duties.”15 It 
follows that the citizens in a “well-ordered state . . . should have leisure and 
not have to provide for their daily wants.” The secret to solving “the difficulty 
of how this leisure is to be attained” is in the management of “their subject 
population”16: “For many necessaries of life have to be supplied before we can 
have leisure. Therefore a city must be temperate and brave, and able to 
endure: for truly, as the proverb says, ‘There is no leisure for slaves.’”17 
In respect to its connection to happiness and excellence, the principle of 
leisure is not the absence of action, as in relaxation, but liberal or noble ends 
of action. Political duty is based in such ends. As such, it requires “good 
circumstances” and specifically ownership of property. In contrast, ignoble 
work falls to those like “artisans or any other class which is not a producer of 
excellence” and “have no share in the state.”18 This division of labor and 
property follows from the principle that connects happiness with excellence: 
“a city is not to be termed happy in regard to a portion of the citizens, but in 
regard to them all. And clearly property should be in their hands, since the 
farmers will of necessity be slaves or barbarian country people.”19  
The classical definition of leisure is thus premised not just on the 
separation of the noble life of political citizens from lives devoted to base 
labor, but on the principle of excellence that defines the activities of the 
former, and the benefit that their actions bring to the common good. In 
Aristotle, leisure is specifically understood as purposeful activity, driven by 
ends that alone justify the occupation with the production of life’s necessities.  
It is striking the way that components of this Aristotelian definition of 
leisure have been adapted to provide an image of emancipated life as 
purposively driven, fulfilling, and meaningful activity. For instance, aspects of 
this definition of leisure are pointedly used in romanticism to undermine the 
classical leisure/work distinction: in industrial societies, artisanal labor and 
crafts are meaningful activity, elevated above the factory work of the assembly 
line.20 Rancière, however, is not party to the strategy of an extended franchise 
for leisure, crystallized in the idea that specific kinds of work offer meaningful 
labor. He is especially critical of its dependence on the notion of the superiority 
of craft and artisanal labor as the model of satisfying, skilled work. Of Gabriel 
Gauny, a “jobber” working with wood during the mid-nineteenth century, he 
writes: “It is work compounded of intoxication and obliviousness, not the fine 
harmony of attentive intelligence served by a skilled hand. It . . . divid[es] up 
each hour with the syncopations of anticipation and reminiscence, of 
productive oblivion and unproductive reverie.”21  
Stepping back from the detail of Rancière’s position, it may be objected 
that the range of positions referred to here is too capacious to give a 
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meaningful picture of either work or leisure. To be sure, the Aristotelian 
context of the ancient Greek city-state is far removed from the significant 
changes to working life ushered in by modern industrialization. In particular, 
the raw division of labor that, in its Aristotelian framing, weighs the leisure that 
ensures the excellence and happiness of the city state against the manual 
labor of slaves, artisans, and farmers, seems unsuited for capturing the far-
reaching implications of the changes that include the assimilation of leisure 
activities in work spaces, or work activities in the home in the so-called 
contemporary “knowledge economy” of abstract labor.22  
On its face, Aristotle’s definition of leisure as “activity” also seems remote 
from the specifically honorific sense attached to the leisure class at the end of 
the nineteenth century. Leisure activity in Aristotle is associated with 
excellence: the freedom won from the menial activities directed towards 
survival and accumulation is directed instead to reflection whose aim is 
enhancing the common good. In contrast, Thorstein Veblen’s classic Theory of 
the Leisure Class had defined leisure as the “non-productive consumption of 
time.”23 His study examined how leisure did not suggest either “indolence or 
quiescence.” Rather, it valued the nonproductive use of time out of a “sense 
of the unworthiness of productive work” and “as . . . evidence of pecuniary 
ability to afford a life of idleness.”24 One prominent theme in this study is the 
contrast between the material products of work and the “immaterial” ends 
perfected on account of the past release of the leisure class from “productive 
work.” In this respect, the activity involved in “immaterial” ends is viewed more 
skeptically by Veblen than Aristotle, and the examples chosen by Veblen 
reflect this critical attitude. He includes, for instance, the orthography of the 
English language as satisfying the “law of conspicuous waste” that constitutes 
reputable canons. “It is,” he writes, “archaic, cumbrous, and ineffective; its 
acquisition consumes much time and effort; failure to acquire it is easy of 
detection. Therefore it is the first and readiest test of reputability in learning, 
and conformity to its ritual is indispensable to a blameless scholastic life.”25  
In Veblen’s study, the moral unworthiness of the leisure class is the target 
of some of his formulations. He devised the now widely used notion of 
“conspicuous consumption” as well as the moniker of “vicarious 
consumption,” to define some of the social markers for the privileges of this 
class. Conspicuous consumption becomes “vicarious” when someone other 
than the leisure class is its subject; the consumption in this instance 
nonetheless marks the privileges of the “true” leisure class. The connection 
between consumption and the utility of such consumption for reputability lies, 
Veblen argues, on the production of waste.26 Veblen outlined too the less 
familiar ideas of “conspicuous” and “vicarious” leisure. His intention was to 
point out that some of the “cares” and “utilities” of the modern household are 
of a “ceremonial character” and belong strictly speaking to “the performance 
of leisure.” The labor that ceremonial performance of etiquette requires, when 
it is performed by other than the free head of the household, is classified as 
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vicarious leisure.27 Neither conspicuous nor vicarious leisure has an interest in 
the promotion of the common good, which, by contrast, is the anchor for the 
Aristotelian conception of leisure. Despite Veblen’s satirical treatment of these 
social eccentricities, the study also acknowledges the immaterial benefits 
produced in a “life of idleness,” among which we can include all kinds of 
cultural activity and the particular satisfactions they extend to their producers. 
In this respect, Veblen’s perspective forges the same connection between 
idleness and reflection that also underpins the sentiments of the workers 
studied in Proletarian Nights. These workers yearn for the idle time in which 
to focus their attention on the production of the “immaterial” benefits that 
come from reflection: this includes writing, but also the enjoyment that comes 
from time spent building and enjoying social bonds.28 It is true, however, that 
because Veblen’s study focuses on the activity of the “leisure class” rather than 
the rationale for such a class, a much clearer point of connection to the issue 
of the “intelligence of the oppressed” is made in the references to nobility in 
Aristotle.  
Rancière’s critical perspective on the way that references to nobility 
organize a specific hierarchy of restricted entitlements to leisure and its social 
goods, extends beyond his critique of Aristotle to capture the role of leisure 
in the production of “immaterial” benefits referred to in Veblen’s study. The 
Aristotelian language of nobility is revived and given expanded reference, for 
instance, in romantic texts about artisanal labor. And, it also has a central place 
as one of the organizing principles of literature, according to Rancière. Modern 
literature disregards the hierarchies of the older systems of representation. 
Classical rules of genre had determined not just appropriate topics for poetic 
treatment but also the appropriate style for that treatment. Modern literature 
is defined as “democratic” on account of its indifference to what it treats: 
anything may be a topic for literature. The democratic attitude to topic and 
style is paralleled to the post-Revolutionary shift in the distribution of roles 
and capacities in the social body. If noble action had previously belonged to 
the realm of the poetical, and prosaic life was considered to have its own 
territory, modern literature changed this logic of distribution:  
The traditional expressive relationships between words, feeling, and 
positions collapsed. . . . There were no longer noble words and 
ignoble words, just as there was no longer noble subject matter and 
ignoble subject matter. The arrangement of words was no longer 
guaranteed by an ordered system of appropriateness between words 
and bodies.29  
The collapse of the traditional relation between words and bodies has 
political significance. However, in Rancière’s analysis of the signal works that 
articulate this collapse, he emphasizes that it is style rather than politics that 
generally motivates its aesthetic precepts. Hence, he often refers to Flaubert’s 
apolitical conception of style as “an absolute way of seeing things.” And, he 
argues that in Flaubert’s account of the mediocre love affairs of a farm girl in 
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Madame Bovary, style is not used to dignify or beautify the mediocrity of the 
subject matter, rather it documents the new field of microsensations which 
displace the traditional focus on noble deeds. Flaubert turns the expression of 
these sensations into the task of literature. The content of the “event” when 
“Charles first falls for Emma” in Madame Bovary is the “draught beneath the 
door” that “blows a little dust over the flagstones.” When “Emma falls for 
Rodolphe she perceives little gleams of gold around his pupils, smells a 
perfume of lemon and vanilla, and looks at the long plume of dust raised by 
the stagecoach.” And when Emma falls for Leon “weeds streamed out in the 
limpid water like green wigs tossed away. . . . The sunshine darted its rays 
through the little blue bubbles on the wavelets that kept forming and 
breaking.” This is what happens: “little blue bubbles” on wavelets in the 
sunshine, or swirls of dust raised by the wind. This is what the characters feel 
and what makes them happy: a pure flood of sensations.30 Flaubert’s novels 
present the schism between the failings of characters still “trapped in the old 
poetics with its combinations of actions, its characters envisaging great ends, 
its feelings related to the qualities of persons, its noble passions opposed to 
everyday experience, and so on,” and the structuring perspective of the writing 
which defends an ontology in which “life has no purpose. It is an eternal flood 
of atoms that keeps doing and undoing in new configurations.”31 Rancière 
thinks this ontological disposition towards the disorder of sensations, despite 
Flaubert’s apoliticism, is well disposed for dismantling sociopolitical 
hierarchies. The disregard for the traditional association of the poetic with 
noble characters in modern literature more generally is one way that 
established patterns for organizing social perception lose their authority.  
In endorsing the consequences of this literary revolution, Rancière is 
unsurprisingly at odds with Aristotle for whom the principle of noble action is 
the basis for the division between leisure and work, as well as for the 
distinction between the poetic and the merely ordinary. 
In contrast, the critique of the idea of nobility in artisanal work in 
Rancière’s Proletarian Nights is fundamentally compatible with the Aristotelian 
association of artisanal labor with ignobility. Aristotle’s use of his “rational 
principle”32 and freeing of the citizens for excellence as the rationale for this 
association, differs of course from Rancière’s approving citation of the artisans’ 
reasoning for their unhappiness. But, they seemingly share the view of labor, 
whether or not it is artisanal, as an unemancipated state. Each would, 
therefore, distrust Veblen’s moral inflation of work and related association of 
leisure with waste. 
However, unlike Aristotle, who associates leisure with the notion of action 
whose rational principle is happiness, Rancière highlights the significance of 
the state of reverie as an alternative marker for the emancipated life. Inaction 
is the principle of emancipation, and not, as in Aristotle, noble action. It is 
worth noting that whereas noble action has the common good in view in 
Aristotle, in Rancière the state of reverie is viewed specifically as a type of 
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experience. The general importance of this experience is related to the 
communicative potential that particular instances of reverie may have. Any 
collective significance deriving from this state of inaction depends entirely on 
the importance reverie holds as an (individual) experience, and it is a 
secondary amplification of this experience. The consequences of the position 
are therefore different from the target of Veblen’s criticisms of vicarious leisure 
and conspicuous consumption. Neither of these terms model collective values; 
they are instead signs of collective decadence.  
The theme of reverie is consistent across the scattered archival, 
historiographical, philosophical, literary, and aesthetic contexts of Rancière’s 
writing. But since reverie is defined as disengagement from action, the 
position raises several difficulties as an approach to emancipation, which I will 
discuss below. 
The Distinction Between Leisure and Reverie  
As we saw, the distinction between work and leisure not only deals with 
defining types of activity, but in specifying how specific kinds of activity relate 
to states like happiness. It has heuristic value as a way of comprehending 
markers of distinction in social practices, including Aristotle’s notion of 
excellence. And, since the distinction pertains to types of “activity,” it may also 
be revised to reconceptualize work from the perspective of leisure, so that the 
notion of “meaningful work” or “self-directed” activity are points of advocacy. 
Rancière’s criticisms of the conceptual machinery involved in the work/leisure 
distinction make it clear that he views it as a synthesis of hierarchically coded 
activities, in which “the many” labor to support the satisfying activities of “the 
few.” He counters, rather than revises, the distinction by pointing to literary 
and historical instances of the connection between the state of reverie and 
emancipatory states and feelings, including happiness. Reverie is defined as 
the emancipatory feeling experienced on the basis of self-aware 
disengagement from activity.33 It is true that the dislocation from action in the 
state of reverie does not seem to coordinate with a theory of emancipation as, 
for instance, advocacy for “meaningful work” might. The type of feeling 
involved and the characteristics of the state are at odds with any such theory, 
and perhaps this is his intention. Let me explain this point. 
 It is tempting to see in Rancière’s formulation of reverie a version of the 
originally aesthetic concept of aesthetic disinterest. One factor in favor of such 
an interpretation is the emphasis on aesthetics in his conception of what is 
involved in altering established patterns of social perception. Clearly, Rancière 
identifies in the Kantian formulation of aesthetic disinterest a fundamental 
dislocation from the ends associated with either pragmatic activity or 
conceptual reflection, and he ties the Kantian position explicitly to the state of 
reverie.34 What is key in this definition of reverie is not the aesthetic references, 
despite the attention they elicit in the scholarship, but that reverie is an 
emancipated state. This is what differentiates reverie from those types of 
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activities in which the ends are specified, as in the case of “work” having its 
end specified as “leisure,” in Aristotle. In describing instances of this state in 
specific contexts, Rancière highlights an accessible form of experience. In this 
respect, reverie is related to one of the stated motivations of the Kantian 
conception of taste, which is to dethrone the rule of expertise in matters of 
taste. The key plank in Kant’s theory of taste is that “taste is subjective.” It is a 
feeling that cannot be governed by rules or experts. One of the significant 
implications of the position is that the capacity for judgments of taste is 
universal; it merely requires the cultivation of disinterested attention to form. 
The attention is disinterested, rather than indifferent. It pursues neither 
cognitive (conceptual) nor pragmatic (practical) ends as the purpose of the 
judgement. Neither a knowledge claim nor a function ascribed to an object 
are at stake, merely the pleasure in the subject’s faculties’ presentation of form. 
Taste is also distinguished from the venal affections of appetite, which are 
dependent on the object of the appetitive pleasure, rather than in taste, on 
form alone. When it is released from these types of dependent judgments, 
taste gains an (analogous) connection with moral significance because its 
quality of disinterested liking shows that liking can be independent of 
“satisfaction.” If something can be “liked for its own sake,” aesthetic taste 
provides support for the liking for the moral law and encouragement for moral 
action, which goes against sensuous inclinations and strategic calculations. 
Kant connects taste not just with a moral interest, but with the social interest 
in communicating one’s judgments. The communication of taste is the key 
way that the expectation for agreement in disinterested judgements is 
expressed, and also the way that such judgments are enhanced and 
developed.35  
The motivation for the Kantian theory has some striking points of 
compatibility with Rancière’s position on reverie, in regard specifically to the 
universal status of the capacity and the moral significance that can be attached 
to its exercise and communication. We might say that the articulation of this 
universal status against the privileges of “expertise” is compatible with 
Rancière’s notion of intellectual equality, and that the exercise of this capacity 
for aesthetic taste in Kant has a loose parallel with the emphasis Rancière 
places on the verification of equality. However, the disengagement from 
activity that is the core of the definition of reverie has no direct parallel in this 
concept of aesthetic disinterest. In fact, it is at odds with the general 
framework of Kantian aesthetics, which intends to demonstrate that his moral 
philosophy is no mere “theory” of human action, but that it is supported in the 
seemingly contingent accord between nature’s beautiful forms and judgments 
of taste. This accord demonstrates “that nature speaks to us figuratively in its 
beautiful forms” and that there is an “attunement favourable to moral feeling” 
in the contemplation of “the beautiful forms of nature.”36 Crucially, there is a 
pleasure attached to the communication of such judgments. And the Kantian 
approach may on this point be compared with Rancière’s view of the 
importance of communicating emancipatory experiences, such as reverie.  
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 Recent attempts to use the concept of work to characterize Rancière’s 
approach to emancipation, also risk underplaying the significance of “reverie” 
as disengagement from action. Jean-Philippe Deranty has contrasted a 
“workerist” and “post-workerist” position in Rancière’s writing. Deranty 
isolates two “discoveries” that explain the shift in position. He argues that after 
the split with Althusser, Rancière discovered how “flawed it is to search for a 
true working class experience” if one denies “the relevance and authenticity of 
the real working class voices.”37 But, in a key methodological development, 
Rancière later discovers that it is a mistake to ignore those voices that “miss 
or lead away” from “typical . . . working class experience.” The true speech is 
not the one that represents a position or identity, but the one that seeks to 
escape from the “proletarian fate.”38 In turn, the positive reference to “work as 
professional culture and social identifier” gives way to a position on work as a 
purely negative category. There is no dignity “that would be grounded in 
physical expenditure or manual skill”39; work as a type of experience and 
culture “is explicitly rejected.”40 Chapter 3 of the Nights of Labor, Deranty 
points out, is dedicated “to denouncing the perniciousness of any positive 
reference to the necessity of work, which ignores the suffering entailed in the 
necessity to have to work in order to live.”41 Further, the last part of the book 
shows how the utopian disciples of Saint-Simon were not able to combine the 
political and legal demands of workers for “full equality and freedom, with the 
dream of the association of free producers.”42 Nonetheless, against the thesis 
of a shift away from the workerist perspective in Rancière’s writing, Deranty 
argues that work is more like a “vanishing mediator” across the corpus. It is 
not just that the workerist period “bequeathed” the defining notion of the 
“intelligence of the oppressed” to the post-workerist perspective, but that the 
distance now taken to the associative model of work may be negative, but it 
is nonetheless still a key principle: “the historical examples of the proletarian 
writers demonstrate a general truth about politics; namely, that it is waged as 
the attempt to escape the denial of freedom and equality entailed in the 
different forms of social destiny.”43 Work is thus the “secret source”44 of the 
later aesthetic and political writing. Rancière’s “originality . . . stems from the 
complex logic he establishes between social life and political claims” such that 
social life has no explanatory or causal relation to politics. This distinctive 
approach to politics did not just originate in his “study of the labour 
movement,” for even in texts after 1995 “the world of work” continues “to 
represent the paradigmatic example of such politics.”45  
 Deranty’s focus falls on how ways out of an oppressed position are 
conceptualized and articulated. Rancière’s position is built up, Deranty states, 
as a “complex process of sedimentation” where the “positive elements are 
retained as established principles, while negative elements account for the 
more spectacular shifts.”46 This construction, which intends to explain different 
positions in the corpus along an arc of development, presents the later 
emphasis on exit points as opposed to identities, in terms of methodological 
refinements.  
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In his response to Deranty, Rancière characterizes the drive to systematize 
his corpus as consistent with the practices that define the publishing category 
of “French Thought.”47 He identifies the puzzle his own writing poses for such 
systematic treatment, since it is a collection of “various interventions” on 
“disordered topics”.48 Although he acknowledges the presence of references 
to the topic of work and the plausibility of Deranty’s arrangement of them, 
Rancière asks whether in looking for a methodological thread to organize the 
scattered corpus, the full meaning he ascribes to the topic of work is 
adequately captured.49 In particular, if his stated interest is in pursuing a 
“genealogy” of the mechanisms that concern “willed action” rather than 
“work,”50 then, he argues, the perspective of aesthetic experience is the 
decisive one: “Rousseau’s reverie, Kant’s finality without end, Schiller’s play 
impulse, all signal the abolition of [the] division of the world into two kinds of 
sensible humanity.”51 It is true that this abolition “has practical counterparts in 
the forms of emancipation through which the workers declare themselves 
inhabitants of the same sensible world as the poets.”52 But the key point is 
that at its core emancipation “entails the acquisition of the most precious of 
goods that the men of action had so far kept to themselves that is, the power 
to do nothing and to want to do nothing.”53 Hence Rancière describes the 
story of Stendhal’s The Red and the Black in the following way:  
This is the story of a plebeian who has used all possible strategies to 
climb the social ladder and who discovers, while waiting for death in 
jail, the true secret of happiness, which is to do nothing and to no 
longer want anything. The lesson is not just valid for the 
individualistic artist; it is also true for the rise of the class of workers 
in the new society. The . . . Saint-Simonians who had gone to recruit 
shock workers for their industrial armies only encounter dreamers 
who find nothing better to express their adherence to the new faith 
than this formula, by one of them: “When I think about the beauties 
of Saint-Simonism, my hand stops.”54  
The workers of the popular revolution had already asserted as part of their 
reign: “the pleasure to do nothing, the pleasure to erase the old separations 
between activity and passivity, between work and leisure.”55 There is a 
“suspension” of activity “at the heart of emancipatory practice,” which theses 
about emancipatory politics translate “in the terms of science and strategy” to 
“endlessly . . . correct . . . the illusions of the agents of production.”56 He refers 
to Althusserianism and “Marxist theses about the necessity to wait for the 
development of the productive forces, as a necessary preamble to any 
revolutionary action, as a way of still translating in the terms of science and 
strategy this suspension at the heart of emancipatory practice.”57 Rancière 
views this suspension as an emancipatory experience; for him, its “translation” 
into “science and strategy” hollows it out. But what of the translation of this 
suspension into a “theory of work”?   
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Deranty’s account of Rancière’s writing from the perspective of “work” 
focuses on the implications of signal methodological choices. The strategy is 
appropriate for his systematizing treatment, and its retrospectively unifying 
perspective on the corpus. However, Rancière’s use of the state of reverie may 
be cited to show that he is not interested in writing a theory of work, but in 
presenting different experiences of an exit from willed action. I would now like 
to explore the implications of this focus on experience as an approach to the 
topic of emancipation. The approach may be analyzed in the context of 
Rancière’s treatment of the state of reverie, but, I will argue below, its working 
examples are not reducible to such an instance of disengagement from “willed 
action.” 
The Action of Inaction: Emancipatory and Communicable 
Experiences 
We have covered the classical distinction between work and leisure in 
Aristotle. We have also considered Aristotle’s central thesis that the excellence 
of true action elevates the state of leisure, and those entitled to it, above those 
who work. And we have looked at Rancière’s counter view that in the age of 
revolutions it is reverie, not leisure, that is the emancipated state.  
 When Rancière gives the critical account of leisure that underpins his 
positive view of reverie, he often highlights the pivotal importance of modern, 
aesthetic experience. As we saw, it is the potential disturbance that aesthetic 
experience represents for the contingent set of hierarchical arrangements that 
constitute social order, that marks its importance. The social order enforces a 
division of the sensible, which new forms of perception, such as the attention 
to the microperceptions that are used to describe events in modern literature, 
promise to render otiose. Hence, aesthetic experience is connected in a loose 
sense with the dissolution of hierarchies involved in revolutionary experience. 
Sometimes Rancière puts this point quite forcefully. Aesthetic experience is 
charged, he writes, with the “abolition of a whole set of oppositions that used 
to structure the sharing/dividing of the sensible: activity/passivity, 
work/leisure, play/seriousness.” This abolition of “the old order” is focused on 
the 
rule that granted the same men the privileges of gratuitous leisure and of 
true action that aims only for its own perfection. Leisure, Aristotle said, is 
not a break between two periods of work; leisure is the condition of those 
who are free from its constraints. And true action is action that carries its 
end in itself, not the action that is a means for an external end.58  
In contrast, reverie is the pleasure in “doing nothing.” Reverie is the 
experience of the abolition of the work/leisure opposition. And, this 
opposition is one way that the prevailing division of the sensible is structured. 
Reverie is also prominent in Rancière’s discussion of modern literature as an 
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exemplary expression of the desuetude of the association between leisure and 
nobility. It figures in his discussions of Stendhal and Ibsen, amongst others.59  
 If we step back from the specific contexts in which he discusses reverie, 
it might seem odd, however, that Rancière so favors reverie, when his 
celebrated writing on intellectual emancipation highlights precisely the need 
for willed engagement, which is obviously foreign to the disengaged state of 
the “dreamer.” Indeed, the state of reverie with its suspended relation to action 
in cases, such as Stendhal’s Julien Sorel in The Red and the Black, seems in 
direct conflict with his comments on the will and motivation in The Ignorant 
Schoolmaster. In this book, one of the most significant in his career, Rancière 
reflects on the stultifying effects of “intellectual” mastery. Such stultification 
occurs when the student’s intellectual activity is mediated and restricted by 
the teacher’s explications. The experience is a demotivating one because it 
binds “one mind to another.”60 Against such aggregation, Rancière, parsing 
Jacotot, writes: “In the act of teaching and learning there are two wills and two 
intelligences. We will call their coincidence stultification. In the experimental 
situation Jacotot created, the student was linked to a will, Jacotot’s, and to an 
intelligence, the book’s—the two entirely distinct. We will call the known and 
maintained difference of the two relations—the act of an intelligence obeying 
only itself even while the will obeys another will—emancipation.” The 
characterization of the pivotal role of the will in intellectual emancipation is 
worth noting. It is not just that “attention and research” are driven by the will, 
but that “the lack of will [is what] causes intelligence to make mistakes.”61 
Intellectual emancipation in this work does not occur without the will.62 The 
point is crucial since it is the basis of Rancière’s view that the 
institutionalization of Jacotot’s practice of intellectual emancipation is 
destined to fail. Rancière (through the example of Jacotot) argues that 
intellectual emancipation is an experience that is verified by the exercise of the 
individual will, rather than a problem that could be solved by an institution, or 
a set of guidelines.63 Verification is both a practice of equality and a 
communicable experience (hence the transmission of this experience from 
Jacotot to Rancière).  
The focus on the aesthetic basis of the social revolution in instances of 
reordered social perception may, in this respect, obscure the crucial point: 
experience is the key to Rancière’s conception of emancipation. He doesn’t 
write a theory of emancipation based in methodological refinements about 
how to approach the expressions of the oppressed. Nor does he write a theory 
of emancipation in which emancipation is based in models of aesthetic 
perception.  
Let me be more direct. If reverie is the abolition of the work/leisure 
opposition, its significance does not lie in a raft of refined theoretical 
objections to this opposition, but in the very existence and communication of 
the dreamer’s experience. Instead of a version of the Kantian, aesthetic 
concept of disinterest, which in Kant was primed to support moral action, or a 
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post-workerist perspective that focuses on how the oppressed express their 
aspirations for emancipation, the references Rancière makes to states of 
reverie emphasize that for him, emancipation is a communicable experience, 
or it is nothing. This does not mean, however, that he reduces emancipation 
to a state of reverie. Rather, as his comments in The Ignorant Schoolmaster 
about the will to exercise one’s intelligence show, emancipation is real to the 
extent that it is verified: “Equality is not given, nor is it claimed; it is practiced, 
it is verified.”64  
Hence, the two perspectives—the power to do nothing, and the exercise 
of one’s intelligence—are able to be reconciled in the following way: Each is 
an experience of an emancipated state. The difference is that the first is 
disengaged from action, whereas the second is not. Like the disengaged state, 
the action of the emancipated intelligence communicates what it does. 
Emancipated intelligence communicates when it “gives the means of verifying 
[that] action.”65 In the case of reverie, too, its existence is communicated in the 
description of the pleasure of this state in archives and literature. 
It is true that it is especially significant for Rancière’s account that it is in 
aesthetic and historical contexts, rather than in political theory, that the 
abolition of work and activity in reverie is articulated. But, the tendency to 
focus on its aesthetic context risks overlooking what is most prominent in the 
account: that is, whether or not the state of reverie is found in the workers’ 
archives, or in arguments about aesthetics in philosophy, or in works of 
modern literature—these instances all present describable states of 
emancipation. Rancière’s position differs from those that advocate changes to 
the operation of the work/leisure distinction so that the two sides bleed into 
the other, and the division of labor gives way to a notion of fulfilling work. The 
significance of his discussion of different written states of reverie is that these 
resources are rich in their motivational effects precisely because they describe 
realized and realizable states. When he presents Jacotot’s educational 
experiments in intellectual equality under the sign of a “verifiable” axiom, the 
accent is again on what can be experienced rather than what can be 
systematized in a “theory.”  
In the case of the distinction between work and leisure in Aristotle, true 
action is reserved for those who enjoy the nobility of leisure. Rancière, in 
contrast, selects inaction as the model of emancipation because it is a realized 
feature of workers’ experiences in Proletarian Nights. It is the engagement of 
the will and motivated action that defines intellectual emancipation in other 
works. Against the view that these two positions are in conflict, I have argued 
here that they each represent a view of emancipation as a state that is not just 
experienced, but also put into words. The emancipated life is not a foreign 
creature one advocates for, nor is it a confection of “theoretical” efforts. The 
experience of emancipation happens, and it is communicable. Distilling and 
describing varieties of emancipatory experiences, including instances of the 
state of reverie in literary and archival contexts, as well as those that require 
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an engaged will, is the way that Rancière expresses his solidarity with those on 
the side of intellectual emancipation, and against those who belong to the 





* I would like to thank Mark Howard for his assistance locating some of the source 
material discussed in this essay. I would also like to acknowledge the anonymous 
referees whose helpful comments have helped to sharpen the position defended here. 
1 See Louis Althusser et. al., Reading Capital: The Complete Edition (London: Verso, 
2015), 73–175. 
2 A theme in Proletarian Nights is the articulation of social, as well as personal 
dreams. Jacques Rancière, Proletarian Nights: The Workers’ Dream in Nineteenth-
Century France, trans. John Drury (London: Verso, 2012), see 424–426. 
3 See Rahel Jaeggi, who gives this terminology an extension of sorts when she includes 
issues related to contemporary identity politics in Alienation, trans. Frederick 
Neuhouser and Alan Smith (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016).  
4 See Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Early Writings (London: 
Penguin Books, 1992), 279–401, esp. 378 ff. Marx’s focus is the wage-laborer who 
experiences their labor power as having an existence that is external to them. It is 
not just that they experience their labor as alienated, but as exercising power and 
domination over them. The product of their labor is the property of another. The 
value that the labourer produces above and beyond the maintenance of “labor power” 
is the “surplus value” that accrues to capital. According to Marx, the capitalist mode 
of production “alienates” workers from their “species’ essence” of the pursuit of 
purposeful activities.  
5 See note 20, below. 
6 For a critical discussion, see Jean-Philippe Deranty, Christoph Dejours, Emmanuel 
Renault et. al, The Return of Work in Critical Theory: Self, Society, Politics (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2018).  
7 Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, Two Volumes, vol. 2, ed. Jonathan 
Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1337 b23, 2122. 




A l i s o n  R o s s  |  9 1  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXVII, No 2 (2019)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2019.890 
 
9 Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, 1338 a4–a5, 2122. 
10 Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, 1338 b2, 2123. 
11 Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, 1338 b32, 2123. 
12 Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, 1328 b35–b36, 2108, cf. Nicomachean 
Ethics, 1177 b4, 1861. 
13 Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, 1328 b25–b26, 2108. 
14 Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, 1328 b37–b38, 2108–2109. 
15 Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, 1328 b38–b1329 a2, 2109. 
16 Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, 1269 b12, 2014. 
17 Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, 1334 a19–a21, 2117. 
18 Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, 1329 a20, 2109. 
19 Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, 1329 a24–a26, 2109. 
20 One apposite example of this view would be William Morris’ revival of artisanal 
techniques in everything from book publishing to furniture and wallpaper. Morris 
distrusted the separation of design from production, and railed against the separation 
of beauty from use in industrial production on the one hand, and wasteful displays of 
luxury on the other. His view was that there should be “nothing in your houses that 
you do not know to be useful, or believe to be beautiful.” The connection between 
use and beauty was intimately related to the labor that produced artifacts: “No work 
which cannot be done with pleasure in the doing is worth doing,” Morris in J. W. 
Mackail, The Life of William Morris, vol. 2 (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1899) 
62–64. See also Kristin Ross’s discussion of Morris’ views on the Paris commune and 
the inequality of the classes in Communal Luxury: The Political Imaginary of the Paris 
Commune (London: Verso, 2015). She focuses on the international and transversal 
perspective of his views on 60–61.  
21 Jacques Rancière, Proletarian Nights (London: Verso, 2012), 59. See also 
Proletarian Nights, 45, and for a description of Gauny in a state of reverie, see 81.  
22 See Yannik Thiem, “Critical Theory in the Age of the Knowledge Capitalism: Elusive 
Exploitation, Affects and New Political Economies,” The Journal of Speculative 
Philosophy 31, no. 3 (2017): 468–480. 
23 Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class ([Macmillan, 1899] New York: 
Dover Books, 1994) 28. Veblen’s focus on the honorific status of leisure separates his 
approach from the analysis of leisure in Jürgen Habermas’ analysis of the bourgeois 
public sphere, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Cambridge, Polity 
Press, [1962] 1989). Habermas identifies how once leisure pursuits “become part of 
the cycle of production and consumption,” they are individualized, apolitical 
 
9 2  |  A c t i n g  T h r o u g h  I n a c t i o n  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXVII, No 2 (2019)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2019.890 
 
expressions that are incapable of constituting a “world emancipated from the 
immediate constraints of survival needs” (160–161). 
24 Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class, 28. 
25 Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class, 244.  
26 Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class, 53. See T. W. Adorno’s critique of Veblen, 
“Veblen’s Attack on Culture: Remarks Occasioned by Theory of the Leisure Class,” 
Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung 9, no. 3 (1941): 389–413: “Veblen stands for the bad 
conscience of leisure. He confronts middle class society with its own principle of 
utility and demonstrates to it that according to its own criteria its culture is waste 
and sham, that it is so irrational as to refute the rationality of the whole system. He 
has something of the quality of the burgher who takes the postulate of thrift quite 
seriously” (399). Adorno is critical above all of Veblen’s “puritan ethos of 
workmanship” (400). Veblen “dislikes about capitalism . . . its waste rather than its 
exploitation. He dislikes every superfluous action.” On Adorno’s view, Veblen 
“presupposes” rather than “analyses” the “concepts of the useful and the useless” 
(401). See also William Morris who connects waste with exploitation, note 20. 
27 Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class, 37. See also Kristin Ross’s Fast Cars, Clean 
Bodies: Decolonization and the Reordering of French Culture (Minneapolis: MIT Press, 
1995) for an analysis of how the post-World War II French consumption of luxury goods 
and time saving devices for household chores, paradoxically involved both more 
intense labor on household chores, which now convey, pace Veblen, a higher prestige 
measure, as well as more time at work in order to finance these purchases, resulting 
in a leisure-driven, but work-obsessed and dependent economy.  
28 Rancière, Proletarian Nights, 220–222. 
29 Jacques Rancière, Politics of Aesthetics, trans. Gabriel Rockhill (London: 
Continuum, 2004), 57. 
30 Jacques Rancière, “Why Emma Bovary Had to be Killed,” translation from Flaubert 
by Rancière, Critical Inquiry 34 (2008): 233–248, 242. 
31 Rancière, “Why Emma Bovary Had to be Killed,” 243. 
32 Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, 1333 a17, 2115. 
33 Examples include the character of Julien Sorel in The Red and the Black, who 
Rancière discusses in the context of the suspension from action, the “quality of 
sensible experience where one does nothing” in Aisthesis, 46. His emphasis. 
34 Sorel, Aisthesis, 46.  
35 In this context, Kant describes the interest in taste as a social sense. He specifies 
that this indirect interest has its basis in our “inclination to society” and as such is 
 
A l i s o n  R o s s  |  9 3  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXVII, No 2 (2019)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2019.890 
 
merely an empirical interest in the beautiful. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment 
(Indiana: Hackett Publishing, 1986) §41, 166.  
36 Kant, Critique of Judgment §42, 166–168. 
37 Jean-Philippe Deranty, “Work in the Writings of Jacques Rancière,” in Jacques 
Rancière and the Contemporary Scene: The Philosophy of Radical Equality, eds. Jean-
Philippe Deranty and Alison Ross (London: Continuum, 2012): 187–205, 197. 
38 Deranty, “Work in the Writings of Jacques Rancière,” 197. 
39  Jacques Rancière, Nights of Labor, Deranty’s modified translation, 45. 
40 Deranty, “Work in the Writings of Jacques Rancière,” 198. 
41 Deranty, “Work in the Writings of Jacques Rancière,” 199.  
42 Deranty, “Work in the Writings of Jacques Rancière,” 199. 
43 Deranty, “Work in the Writings of Jacques Rancière,” 200. 
44 Deranty, “Work in the Writings of Jacques Rancière,” 201. 
45 Deranty, “Work in the Writings of Jacques Rancière,” 204. 
46 Deranty, “Work in the Writings of Jacques Rancière,” 200. 
47 Jacques Rancière, “Work, Identity, Subject,” in Jacques Rancière and the 
Contemporary Scene, 205–217, 205, his emphasis and capitals. 
48 Rancière, “Work, Identity, Subject,” 205. 
49 Rancière, “Work, Identity, Subject,” 206. 
50 Rancière, “Work, Identity, Subject,” 215. 
51 Rancière, “Work, Identity, Subject,” 216. 
52 Rancière, “Work, Identity, Subject,” 216. 
53 Rancière, “Work, Identity, Subject,” 216, emphasis added. 
54 Rancière, “Work, Identity, Subject,” 216. See also Alison Ross, “The Conception of 
the Will in Rancière’s Aesthetic Regime of the Arts: Pathos and Reverie in Stendhal, 
Ibsen and Freud,” in Understanding Rancière, Understanding Modernism, ed. Patrick 
Bray (London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017) 179–197. 
55 Rancière, “Work, Identity, Subject,” 216. 
56 Rancière, “Work, Identity, Subject,” 216. 
57 Rancière, “Work, Identity, Subject,” 216. 
58 Rancière, “Work, Identity, Subject,” 215–216. 
59 See Rancière, Aisthesis, 39–53; Rancière, The Aesthetic Unconscious (London, UK: 
Polity, 2009), 69–82. 
60 Jacques Rancière, The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual 
Emancipation, trans. Kristin Ross (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 13: 
“There is no intelligence where there is aggregation, the binding of one mind to 
 
9 4  |  A c t i n g  T h r o u g h  I n a c t i o n  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXVII, No 2 (2019)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2019.890 
 
another. There is intelligence where each person acts, tells what he is doing, and 
gives the means of verifying the reality of his action,” (32). Note, that each person 
acting and telling what they do is the “means of verifying the reality” of action. A 
similar emphasis on telling the emancipatory effects of reverie connects the two 
examples and distinguishes the experience of emancipation from a private state 
without any collective implications. 
61 Rancière, Ignorant Schoolmaster, 54 and 55. 
62 Rancière, Ignorant Schoolmaster, 54: “Will is the power to be moved, to act by its 
own movement, before being an instance of choice.” 
63 Rancière, Ignorant Schoolmaster, 119 and 130. 
64 Rancière, Ignorant Schoolmaster, 137. 
65 Rancière, Ignorant Schoolmaster, 32. 
